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1 Competing principles of copyright law 
Copyright and intellectual property law has become, in many respects, the crucible for 
issues and challenges presented by the development of new media for law and policy. 
These legal and policy issues are being played out in a variety of national and 
international forums, and are at the core of how the digital economy will develop in the 
21st century. 
One of the features of debates surrounding copyright law is that they typically 
combine longstanding issues with more contemporary ones. The history of copyright, 
going back to the 18th century and the Statute of Anne in Britain in 1709 and the  
US Copyright Act of 1790 onwards (Bettig, 1996; Boyle, 1997; Litman, 2001; Drahos 
and Braithwaite, 2002; D’Agostino, 2010), has brought forward four enduring questions: 
1 Identifying the most appropriate balance between public good and private benefit 
criteria for the use of, and access to, information. This balance is one that needs  
to both support innovation and the creation of original content, yet also promote 
sufficiently widespread access to existing information so that it can be effectively 
used to create new knowledge. 
2 Determining the most appropriate balance between individual rights of ownership 
and forms of social use for common benefit. 
3 Dealing with the legal implications of knowledge existing as both a commodity that 
can be used for commercial advantage, and as a public good available to all for 
common use. 
4 The best ways in which to both promote and equitably share the benefits of 
knowledge and creativity. 
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Copyright is a form of intellectual property that incorporates rights in artistic and literary 
works, as distinct from industrial property rights such as patents, designs and trademarks. 
Copyright law is derived from the principle that neither the creator of a new work nor the 
general public should be able to appropriate all of the benefits that flow from the creation 
of a new, original work of authorship. It presumes that original forms of creative 
expression can belong to individuals, who have both a moral right to ownership and a 
legitimate economic right to derive material benefit from the use of these works by 
others, as an incentive to create further original works. It also presumes that the use of 
their original works should be subject to the laws of free and fair exchange, that there 
should be adequate compensation of use by others, and there should be safeguards against 
misuse. 
At the same time, it is recognised that original ideas and works are drawn from an 
existing pool of knowledge and creativity, and that it is therefore essential to guarantee 
that such ideas and works can exist in the public domain so that they can be fairly used by 
others. Moreover, since such information is the lifeblood of democracy, commerce, and 
the development of future knowledge, broad access by the community to the widest 
possible pool of information, knowledge, and forms of creative expression is a valuable 
end in itself, as a condition for participation in public life and the development of new 
knowledge. In order to balance these competing claims on knowledge, copyright law 
divides up the possible rights in uses of protected works, giving control over some of 
these rights to the creators and distributors and control over others to the general public. 
Copyright law includes a series of exceptions where it is deemed to be in the public 
interest to make material more widely available at no cost. These exceptions form a 
fundamental part of the copyright balance by limiting the extent of the copyright grant 
(Leval, 1989). The Australian Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), like the copyright law of most 
jurisdictions, and unlike that of the USA, contains no open ended ‘fair use’ exception to 
copyright. Instead, Australian law includes a series of exceptions for specific purposes 
(including research and study; criticism and review; news reporting; parody and  
satire – ss 40–43, 103A–104) and specific technological use cases (including limited 
format-shifting and time-shifting – ss 110AA, 111). The question of whether these 
limitations are appropriately tailored for the digital economy is currently under 
consideration by the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC). The limitations to 
copyright should ideally ensure that copyright law does not unnecessarily constrain the 
ability of people to learn from existing works; to critique or discuss cultural materials and 
contribute to public discourse; to innovate and compete; and to create new works of 
authorship (Samuelson, 2008; Suzor, 2013). This last category includes transformative 
use, which has been defined by the ALRC as involving ‘works that transform pre-existing 
works to create something new that is not merely a substitute for the pre-existing work. 
Works that are considered transformative may include those described as ‘sampling’, 
‘remixes’ and ‘mashups’ (ALRC, 2012). Unlike the position under US fair use law, the 
fact that a work is transformative is not in itself a reason to make it non-infringing. As we 
note below, transformative use has become increasingly central to current considerations 
of the scope and limitations of copyright law. 
Embedded within copyright, then, are two competing normative visions of intellectual 
property. One is the notion that it that can be privately owned as property, from which its 
owners can expect a reasonable level of remuneration from its use. The other is that 
intellectual property consists of ideas, concepts and forms of expression whose public 
circulation is central to the principles of freedom of speech, equitable access to public 
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information, and economic efficiency. The cultural economist Christian Handke has 
provided a useful matrix for considering, at a conceptual level, the overall costs and 
benefits of a copyright system.1 
Table 1 Costs and benefits of a copyright system 
 Benefits Costs 
Short run Greater revenues to rights holders Access costs to users 
  Administration costs 
  Transaction costs in trading rights 
Long run Greater incentives to supply  
copyright works for rights holders 
User innovation being obstructed  
by the costs of compliance 
Source: Handke (2011, p.4) 
2 The challenge of the digital economy 
While copyright debates have a long history, the intensity of debates surrounding the 
nature of copyright law, its scope, how it is enforced, and limits set to its reach, has 
increased over the last two decades. A key driver of this has of course been the 
generalisation of global access to the internet and networked personal computing, and the 
associated digitisation of media content, but this is symptomatic of a range of other 
developments. There has been the rise of what has been variously referred to as the 
information society (Bell, 1976), the knowledge economy (David and Foray, 2002), the 
network society (Castells, 1996), the networked information economy (Benkler, 2006), 
the creative economy (Howkins, 2001; UNCTAD, 2010) and, most recently, the digital 
economy (ALRC, 2012). Benkler (2006, p.4) captures the relationship between the new 
economic significance attached to information and knowledge, and the enabling 
capabilities of the internet and digital media, in observing how “removal of the physical 
constraints on effective information production has made human creativity and the 
economics of information … core structuring facts in the new networked information 
economy”. 
Of the many issues that render copyright law ever more complex and significant in an 
age of new media and the internet, four stand out. First, the rapid development and mass 
dissemination of technologies that enable low-cost reproduction of data and information 
has dramatically changed the issues arising in copyright law. The commercial creative 
industries are characterised by high costs of production of original material, a high  
failure rate for new commercial product, and near-zero costs of content reproduction 
(Hesmondhalgh, 2013). From the perspective of rights holders, the unauthorised 
reproduction of works appears as a problem of piracy, and much attention has been given 
to enforcing copyright in the face of illegal copying, as it is seen as preventing rights 
holders from amortising the considerable up-front costs associated with the production of 
new creative works. On the other hand, critics of the copyright industries point to 
inequitable pricing arrangements as drivers of piracy, particularly in developing 
countries, and identify the problems as being one of insufficient attention being given to 
alternative business models in a transformed digital environment (Karaganis, 2011; 
Lobato, 2012). 
Second, the rise of a knowledge economy has seen intellectual property rights 
become a key source of new corporate wealth. As a result, a very high premium is 
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attached to successful creative product that is likely to accrue economic rents over time. 
As Drahos and Braithwaite (2002) note, the ‘knowledge game’ of capturing patents was 
critical to the formation of industry cartels from the early 20th century onwards, and the 
global economy has seen substantial growth in the role played by intellectual property as 
a source of corporate revenues. The World Intellectual Property Office [WIPO, (2010), 
p.33] has observed that the number of patent applications worldwide grew from about  
1 million in 1995 to 1.9 million in 2008, and the number of patents granted increased 
from 450,000 in 1995 to 750,000 in 2008. In discussing the rise of a knowledge 
economy, David and Foray (2002) related the acceleration of knowledge production to 
the interrelationship between four developments: 
1 the growing role of intangible capital (education and training, research and 
development, information, logistics, health) in total capital formation 
2 the growing speed and intensity of innovation, and the increasing diversity of sources 
of innovation, including users themselves as co-creators of new or improved 
products and services 
3 the ICT revolution, which has fundamentally transformed the conditions for creating, 
storing, accessing, distributing and reusing information and data 
4 the rise of knowledge-based communities and global knowledge networks, where 
information can be easily shared and re-used, and where collaboration can occur that 
is not reliant upon physical co-presence in particular geographical locations. 
Third, copyrighted products are now a part of global popular culture to a historically 
unprecedented degree. When combined with the exponential increase in the amount of 
content that is easily available through digital technologies, this also means a massive 
proliferation of infringement in both commercial uses of copyrighted materials  
(e.g., pirated versions of CDs, DVDs, etc.), and non-commercial uses of copyright 
material by consumers in their everyday (digital) lives. In the digital age, where most 
dealings with copyright material are potentially infringing reproductions, the question of 
what rights users have to make uses of copyright material has become increasingly 
important to resolve. As individuals increasingly make use of ‘cloud’ services to retain, 
store, and share content, it also becomes important to consider the limits that exist to the 
liability of intermediaries who facilitate these uses through cloud and other services. In 
the absence of copyright reform, there is a risk that intermediaries cannot be certain of 
their potential exposure for the services they provide, even where most uses are likely 
non-infringing. The uncertainty involved in licensing the unknowable range of user 
behaviours, however, is likely to result in a ‘tragedy of the anti-commons’ (Heller, 1998), 
where high transaction costs and strategic behaviour may prevent efficient licensing of 
the large number of exclusive rights required for any cloud service to operate. They are 
examples of the ‘metapublic’ good status of information, where it is not only valuable to 
the public as a whole, but generates positive benefits to a community over and above
those that are immediate and tangible (Perelman, 2002). 
Finally, copyright and intellectual property law has been progressively globalised
over time, particularly with the passing of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement, signed by more than 100 nations in 1994 after 
agreement by the signatories to the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), 
and the establishment of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) along with 
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the World Trade Organization (WTO). Almost all developing nations are net importers of 
intellectual property, while the USA has such a dominant position as a net intellectual 
property exporter, through creative industries such as software and entertainment as well 
as many of the world’s most important trade marks. Sell (2002, p.185) argued that the 
TRIPS Agreement was reflective of “unchecked industry dominance over the intellectual 
property agenda’ in the 1990s”, which only subsequently came to be more effectively 
challenged by “an increasingly vociferous and mobilised civil society campaign” to 
challenge such dominance. The question of whether the existing global IPR framework 
acts to entrench global inequalities is the subject of ongoing debate in multiple 
international fora (Netanel, 2009; Karaganis, 2011). 
3 The digital economy and creative innovation 
In 2012, the ALRC was given the task of reviewing Australia’s copyright laws in light of 
the digital economy. In the Terms of Reference given by the Attorney-General, the 
ALRC was required to recommend changes to the Copyright Act 1968 with regard to: 
• the objective of copyright law in providing an incentive to create and disseminate 
original copyright materials 
• the general interest of Australians to access, use and interact with content in the 
advancement of education, research and culture 
• the importance of the digital economy and the opportunities for innovation leading to 
national economic and cultural development created by the emergence of new digital 
technologies 
• Australia’s international obligations, international developments and previous 
copyright reviews. 
In doing so, it was asked to consider 
“whether existing exceptions are appropriate and whether further exceptions 
should: 
• recognise fair use of copyright material; 
• allow transformative, innovative and collaborative use of copyright 
materials to create and deliver new products and services of public benefit; 
and 
• allow appropriate access, use, interaction and production of copyright 
material online for social, private or domestic purposes.” [ALRC, (2012), 
p.3] 
Its recommendations need to take account of Australia’s international legal obligations, 
such as the Australia-US Free Trade Agreement, signed in 2005), as well as related 
inquiries such as the Convergence Review into media and communication legislation 
(Convergence Review, 2012). 
The ALRC observed in its Copyright and the Digital Economy issues paper that the 
Terms of Reference for the inquiry require it to consider: 
“Whether amendments to copyright law are required in order to create greater 
availability of copyright material in ways that will be socially and economically 
beneficial … The context and political economy of copyright law is changing 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
    Copyrights and copyfights 7    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
as copyright has a more direct impact on disparate users and producers, 
extending beyond rights holders and institutional rights users.” [ALRC, (2012), 
p.14] 
The ALRC (2012, p.11) follows the Department of Broadband, Communications and the 
Digital Economy definition of the digital economy as “the global network of economic 
and social activities that are enabled by information and communications technologies, 
such as the internet, mobile and sensor networks”. But, as noted above, a variety of other 
synonyms have been used for an economy transformed by digital technologies, including 
the information economy, the knowledge economy and the creative economy. Deloitte 
Access Economics (2011) has referred to the internet economy, estimating that the 
contribution of internet-driven businesses and occupations are worth about $80 billion to 
the Australian economy, or 3.6% of Australia’s GDP. 
Behind the question of nomenclature lies a recurring dilemma in the relationship of 
copyright to these various discourses of the ‘new economy’. On the one hand, the 
creative industries have been defined as combining creative and intellectual talent with 
commercially exploitable intellectual property; sometimes referred to as the copyright 
industries, they are estimated to contribute about 6–8% of the GDP of advanced 
industries economies (PwC, 2012; WIPO, 2012). On the other hand, overly restrictive 
copyright laws that are poorly designed for the digital economy present their own costs, 
which are largely invisible yet substantial. The Hargreaves Report estimated that 
copyright reform could add between 0.3% and 0.6% to the size of the UK economy by 
2020 – between £5 billion and £8 billion – and that deadweight costs in the economy 
could be reduced by over £750 m (Hargreaves, 2011). In its responses to the Hargreaves 
Report, the UK Government identified some of these deadweight costs as including: 
“Vital medical research held up, cultural and commercially useful works locked 
away for generations and crumbling in archives for want of an owner to give 
permission for their use, and great business ideas that can’t be turned into 
successful, growing businesses.” [HM Government, (2011), p.3] 
The ALRC faced a review of copyright law where strong claims about its economic costs 
and benefits can be found on both sides of the ledger. It sought in its issues paper  
to reconcile these competing claims by adopting a principles-based approach to the 
evaluation of current copyright law and recommendations for change [ALRC, (2012):, 
pp.19–22]. The eight principles that the ALRC articulated as informing its deliberations 
were: 
• reform should promote the development of the digital economy by providing 
incentives for innovation in technologies and access to content (Principle 1) 
• reform should encourage innovation and competition and not disadvantage 
Australian content creators, service providers or users in Australian or international 
markets (Principle 2) 
• reform should recognise the interests of rights holders and be consistent with 
Australia’s international obligations (Principle 3) 
• reform should promote fair access to and wide dissemination of information and 
content (Principle 4) 
• reform should ensure that copyright law responds to new technologies, platforms and 
services (Principle 5) 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   8 T. Flew et al.    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
• reform should take place in the context of the ‘real world’ range of consumer and 
user behaviour in the digital environment (Principle 6) 
• reform should promote clarity and certainty for creators, rights holders and users 
(Principle 7) 
• reform should promote the development of a policy and regulatory framework that is 
adaptive and efficient and takes into account other regulatory regimes that impinge 
on copyright law (Principle 8). 
4 Copyright and innovation 
One of the difficulties in addressing the question of whether copyright laws affect the 
introduction of new or innovative business models is the absence of counter-factual 
information, or what Towse (2011, p.110) describes as “a situation comparable to those 
in which copyright does apply to one in which it does not”. Towse (2011, p.111) also 
observes that “fast moving technical changes also affect production and consumption and 
it can be very difficult to pin down a ‘before’ and ‘after’ test of the impact of the change 
to copyright law”. 
Over the last two decades, copyright owners have often responded to the challenges 
of copying in the digital environment through strategies of enforcement and deterrence. 
Copyright owners have sought to shift user behaviour and the social norms that support 
infringement through education campaigns, high profile lawsuits against both 
intermediaries and individual users, and, most recently, decentralised warning and 
enforcement through internet service providers. In order to support these efforts, pressure 
has been applied to governments worldwide to strengthen copyright law by reducing 
exceptions, increasing its duration, increasing penalties, and providing cheaper and more 
punitive enforcement mechanisms. None of these approaches have so far been able to 
substantially reduce copyright infringement. 
With some notable exceptions, copyright industries around the world have been slow 
to offer legitimate alternatives to satisfy consumer demand for creative content. The 
absence of lawful and convenient digital services, offering timely and affordable access 
to copyright material, appears to be a key driver of infringement. In his international 
study of media piracy in emerging economies for the U.S. Social Science Research 
Council, Karaganis (2011) observed that high prices for digital media goods relative to 
income was a primary driver of piracy in developing countries, that anti-piracy measures 
and copyright education had little impact, and that rising standards of living combined 
with competition that reduced prices for legitimate product were the key factors in 
reducing overall levels of piracy. 
Since ‘born digital’ information is very easy to copy and distribute, the prospect of 
eliminating all forms of illegal copying is near zero. The economist Hal Varian has 
identified a number of possible alternative business models that could be adopted by 
copyright industries. These included price discrimination (e.g., making the physical copy 
more attractive to consumers than the downloaded version), delivery of bundled services 
(e.g., providing free access to a back catalogue for subscribers), and advertising around 
digital content as an alternative revenue stream to direct sales. He observed that 
“copyright is a second-best solution to intellectual property provision”, but also that “the 
same technological advances that are making digital content inexpensive to copy are also 
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helping to reduce the fixed cost of content creation”, and that lower production costs 
leading to lower prices has its own dynamic in reducing levels of content piracy [Varian, 
(2005), p.136]. 
The work of both Varian and Karaganis indicates that it is innovative new business 
models, rather than strengthened regimes of copyright enforcement, that is likely to 
ultimately be of most significance in reducing piracy and copyright infringement, and 
developing sustainable business models for the creative industries in the digital age. In 
Hidden Innovation: Policy, Industry and the Creative Sector, Cunningham (2013) 
identifies a number of ways that this has been addressed by companies such as  
Google, including the ContentID and Partnership programmes developed for YouTube. 
The successes of digital distribution stores such as Apple’s iTunes for music, apps, and 
games, Valve’s Steam for games, and Amazon’s Kindle store for books also demonstrate 
that consumers are willing to pay for convenient access to copyright content. The 
increasing range of subscription-based services, like Netflix and Spotify, are beginning to 
show how sustainable models may develop in the absence of scarcity. 
All of these models focus on providing users with the carrots of legitimate digital 
distribution channels – rather than the sticks of harsher and more regular enforcement. It 
seems reasonable to expect that innovation in copyright business models may be more 
fruitful in the long term than efforts to increase the strength or frequency of penalties for 
copyright infringement (Summer et al., 2011). This is particularly the case where, as the 
recording industry has demonstrated, enforcement actions come at great public relations 
costs, and where new digital models can provide significant efficiency gains in reducing 
distribution costs. 
5 Copyright and the creative community 
It is often assumed that, whatever the benefits for consumers of lower-cost or free digital 
goods, the existence of copyright and other forms of intellectual property protection is 
particularly important to artists and others involved in the production of creative works. 
In a study commissioned by the Australia Council for the Arts, Throsby and  
Zednik (2010, p.60) highlighted “the importance of intellectual property as a means of 
providing remuneration to creators”, and argued that “the copyright held by writers, 
visual artists, craft practitioners and composers in the literary, dramatic, artistic and 
musical works that they create may be essential to their economic survival”. On such a 
basis, the case is made for the centrality of copyright protection for those working in the 
arts and creative industries. 
Given the importance attached to copyright for the income of artists, it is a subject 
around which surprisingly little research has been undertaken, at least in Australia.2 A 
2003 study for the Australia Council (Throsby and Hollister, 2003) attempted to calculate 
the actual contribution of royalties and other copyright-related revenue streams to the 
incomes of Australian artists. This study found that royalties, advances and other 
copyright earnings accounted for 6% of the creative income of the over 1,000 artists it 
surveyed, with the Public Lending Right and the Educational Lending Right accounting 
for a further 2%. These sources of creative income were particularly important for writers 
(27% of total creative income) and composers (23% of creative income): for all other 
categories of artistic and creative practice surveyed, they accounted for no more than 2% 
of total creative income. 
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Table 2 Sources of creative income by category of artist in Australia, 2003 (percent) 
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This is not to say that income derived from copyright is unimportant to artists as a group, 
or to some artists: a minority of works does continue to generate significant revenues for 
rights holders over time. However, available evidence does not support the claim that the 
current copyright regime is of such importance for the generation of new artistic and 
creative works that the supply of new works would be significantly inhibited by changes 
to those laws (Kretschmer and Hardwick, 2007). It is consistent with international 
findings, reported by Towse (2011, p.107), that “research on artists’ total earnings 
including royalties shows that only a small minority earns an amount comparable to 
national earnings in other occupations and only ‘superstars’ make huge amounts’. The 
economist Caves (2000) associated this with the ‘A list’ / ‘B list’ phenomenon, or the 
economics of superstars, in the creative industries, where an elite cohort of creative 
producers are able to accrue economic rents, through mechanisms such as copyright 
payments, long after the period of production. Copyright does play a role in the 
incentives of commercial producers of copyright works, who provide employment for 
creators, but the extent of this role has not been extensively studied and would appear to 
be less than is commonly thought. Certainly the problems of inadequate incomes for most 
artists in Australia cannot be redressed through stronger enforcement of existing 
copyright laws. 
There is considerable evidence which indicates that the complexity of copyright 
imposes significant inefficiencies on users of copyright material, particularly for creators 
using existing material in the creation of new works. This is particularly visible in the 
film industry, where high transaction costs in identifying and negotiating with rights 
holders has been identified as a factor that often prevents creators and users from 
reaching mutually beneficial outcomes. Wilson (2009, p.6) noted that “[t]here can be 20 
or more rights holders in a screen content product and rarely are there less than six”. 
Creators of new works typically face high transaction costs in obtaining licences from all 
relevant rights holders (Heller, 1998). Creators also often face insurmountable difficulties 
with orphan rights, uncooperative right holders, and the lack of clarity that surrounds 
performance rights. The full costs of administering, licensing, and enforcing copyright in 
Australia have not been examined in sufficient detail. In particular, there has been little 
empirical examination of the transaction costs of negotiating copyright licences, and the 
cost structure of copyright licensing has not been examined systematically. Some 
empirical evidence exists in comparable jurisdictions (Aufderheide and Jaszi, 2004; 
McLeod and DiCola, 2011), but quantitative data on the costs of copyright in Australia is 
very limited. 
The problems have been identified in the documentary filmmaking field by 
Aufderheide and Jaszi (2004), whose survey of US documentary filmmakers found: 
• rights clearance costs are high, and have escalated dramatically in the last two 
decades 
• gatekeepers, such as distributors and insurers, enforce rigid and high-bar rights 
clearance expectations 
• the rights clearance process is arduous and frustrating, especially around movies and 
music 
• rights clearance problems force filmmakers to make changes that adversely  
affect – and limit the public’s access to – their work, and the result is significant 
change in documentary practice. 
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An interview conducted with documentary filmmaker Cathy Henkel supported these 
findings.3 Discussing her 2012 documentary Show Me the Magic, about the acclaimed 
Australian cinematographer Don McAlpine, Henkel observed that in order to get clips 
from his famous films, such as Romeo & Juliet and Moulin Rouge, she faced standard 
licence fees of around $300,000, and rights holders that were initially not willing to 
negotiate licence fees that were acceptable to all parties. The difficulties Henkel faced 
were compounded by overlapping contractual rights that prevented studios from 
providing licences, which meant that Henkel had to seek agreements from many of the 
actors and extras in each clip, including stunt people and dancers. Negotiating licences 
for archival footage alone delayed her project by at least two months, and she points out 
that independent documentary filmmakers will never have the resources to meet the 
licence fees being requested. 
6 Fair use and digital copyright exchanges 
Making the copyright system appropriate for the digital economy fundamentally requires 
enhancing the flow of expression for reuse in innovative (and unexpected) ways. In order 
to articulate an effective and fair copyright regime that facilitates reuse of expression, 
particular attention should be paid to the types of uses which should trigger an obligation 
to remunerate the copyright owner, and the categories of uses which are more desirable to 
be open to all, without fee or the need to seek permission. We conclude this paper with a 
discussion of a combination approach to addressing some of the problems identified 
above in a way that can extend ‘fair use’ provisions in ways appropriate to the digital age, 
without disadvantaging existing rights holders or undermining copyright law more 
generally. We argue copyright law should positively empower users to make socially 
valuable uses of copyright works that impose little harm on copyright owners, that are 
important for speech and democracy, or that are unlikely to be voluntarily licensed. For 
other categories of uses, we suggest that it is crucial to reduce licensing transaction costs 
in the digital economy. To this end, we investigate the concept of digital copyright 
exchanges (DCXs), which have been featured in recent UK reports, such as Digital 
Opportunity: A Review of Intellectual Property and Growth, authored by Professor Ian 
Hargreaves (Hargreaves, 2011), and Copyright Works: Streamlining Copyright Licensing 
for the Digital Age (Hooper and Lynch, 2012). 
Copyright law in the digital age needs to address three key issues: 
1 it must provide clear exceptions for socially valuable uses for which obtaining a 
licence is inefficient or undesirable 
2 it must enable more streamlined licensing practices for other uses of copyright 
material 
3 it must clearly differentiate between these two categories. 
In the digital age, where many interactions with cultural materials constitute a potential 
infringement of copyright, reducing the friction imposed by the copyright system is of 
primary importance. Reducing friction, in this sense, means both reducing transaction 
costs for uses which should be licensed, and clearly allowing uses for which neither 
permission nor remuneration is deemed necessary. 
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Australian copyright law is currently premised upon a narrow set of purposive ‘fair 
dealing’ exceptions, and a set of complicated statutory licences to address the needs of 
users of copyright material. This approach has proved to be too inflexible to adequately 
address technological change, too limited to provide certainty to intermediaries, and too 
complex to sufficiently reduce transaction costs in licensing. Australian copyright law 
needs to move beyond statutory licences, and instead introduce a broad ‘fair use’ 
exception for uses that do not require remuneration and encourage the development of a 
simplified licensing process for uses that do. 
The challenge for Australian copyright law, if a ‘fair use’ exception is to be 
introduced, is to provide a mechanism to clearly determine which uses should be licensed 
and which uses ought to be available for free reuse. An open-ended ‘fair use’ exception 
should either subsume or act in addition to the existing fair dealing provisions, but must 
provide a simplified, flexible, and technology neutral approach that allows unforeseen 
socially beneficial uses of copyright material. At the same time, a ‘fair use’ exception 
should provide sufficient guidance to enable both users and copyright owners some 
degree of certainty in understanding what types of unlicensed uses are permitted by law. 
Setting the exact bounds of copyright exceptions is a complex and contested political 
process. These boundaries are an enunciation of a particular society’s sense of how to 
best achieve particular cultural goals – including free speech and democratic discourse 
(Netanel, 2008); distributive justice and fair rewards (Sunder, 2012); knowledge and 
learning (Breakey, 2012); and innovation and creative expression (Boyle, 2008; Lessig, 
2002). Whatever its particular bounds, a ‘fair use’ exception should clearly address the 
balance in copyright between the rights of authors and publishers and the needs of both 
readers and future creators. Accordingly, an Australian ‘fair use’ or similar provision 
should particularly remove the need to license uses in situations where licences are 
unlikely to be granted; where the free-speech and other expressive interests of users 
outweigh the interests of copyright owners; and where minimal harm is imposed on the 
legitimate interests of copyright owners by reuses that are transformative or otherwise 
socially valuable. A flexible, open-ended exception is important because many 
innovative, expressive, and valuable uses of copyright material in the digital economy are 
technically infringing, but are outside of the core licensing interests of copyright owners. 
These include broad swathes of amateur creativity; many categories of transformative 
uses that use existing works to create new works that do not directly compete with the 
original; uses for social commentary; uses that promote learning; and personal uses of 
copyright material (Samuelson, 2009). Requiring users and creators to seek licences and 
pay royalties for these uses can often stifle innovation and speech without a strong 
countervailing benefit to authors (Litman, 2010). In all cases, the social interests in 
allowing these types of uses needs to be weighed against the impact on copyright owners, 
so a flexible approach that enables an iterative and ongoing judicial balancing process 
seems to be the most appropriate manner in which to draw the line. In introducing such 
an exception into Australian law, the simplest and most certain approach is likely to be to 
model it closely on the US fair use test, in a way which enables Australian courts to look 
to the substantial US fair use jurisprudence for persuasive precedent (Burrell et al., 2012). 
Our point here is not to prescribe a particular form of exception, but instead to note that 
some additional flexibility is certainly required in Australian law, in order to better enable 
the socially beneficial use and reuse of copyright expression in the digital economy. 
At the same time, there are a large and growing range of ways in which people are 
seeking to use copyright materials that may not be covered by a fair use style provision, 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   14 T. Flew et al.    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
but where licensing arrangements are not able to be negotiated in an efficient or equitable 
manner. This includes the range of uses identified by the Hargreaves Report (Hargreaves, 
2011) and the Hooper Review (Hooper and Lynch, 2012) in the UK as those where 
current arrangements unnecessarily restrict access to copyrighted works, and generate 
transaction costs in excess of those appropriate for use of the material in question. A 
much-cited example would be the use of a piece of music in a recorded wedding video 
that is subsequently placed on YouTube. Outside of the USA, Canada and 11 small 
nations, Google is currently required to block the distribution of such content, as it would 
be in breach of copyright laws. Both content creators and content users would benefit 
from rights being able to be established more straightforwardly, and for a low-cost 
mechanism to exist for the user to fairly reimburse the creator of the copyrighted work 
and enable its distribution by other means. 
The Hargreaves Report recommended that the Government of the UK address this 
problem through the establishment of a DCX. A DCX has been defined as an automated 
e-commerce website or network of websites which allows licensors to set out the rights 
they wish to license and allows licensees to acquire those rights from the licensors (IPO, 
2012). Through such a system, copyright licencees can: 
• look for different types of content across the range of media types 
• define and agree what uses they wish to make of the chosen content with the 
licensors 
• be quoted a price by the licensor for those uses of the specified content that the 
system is programmed to offer 
• pay for the rights online within the normal e-commerce framework 
• have the content made available to them in the appropriate format 
• account back to the licensor as to what content was actually used so that the rights 
creators can be paid their shares. 
The Hargreaves Report identified the benefits of a DCX as enabling “an open, 
standardised approach to data” that would be based around “a network of interoperable 
databases to provide a common platform for licensing transactions” [Hargreaves, (2011), 
p.33]. The benefits that the Hargreaves Report identified from the establishment of a 
DCX include a much more efficient mechanism for consumers and reusers to identify 
copyright owners and obtain licenses. Importantly, a DCX could also provide the 
opportunity for intermediaries to automate licensing through standard terms and to easily 
identify a representative agent for custom licensing negotiations. For creators and rights 
holders, a DCX could provide improved routes to market, clear recording of ownership of 
works and the terms on which they are available for reuse, increased opportunities for 
direct licensing, and a single point of access for collecting societies. 
The two-volume digital copyright feasibility exchange studies undertaken by  
Richard Hooper to the U.K. Intellectual Property Office (IPO, 2012; Hooper and Lynch, 
2012) argued that through a DCX, “copyright licensing can be made more streamlined, 
easier and cheaper to use, especially for the small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
which make up 90% of the creative industries, without eroding the rights of rights 
owners” [Hooper and Lynch, (2012), p.6]. In particular, a copyright exchange would 
enable greater legal clarity, combined with greatly reduced transaction costs, for the use 
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of copyrighted works for purposes that are legitimate from the point of view of the 
content creator, but where it is appropriate that the user should make some financial 
payment for the right to make use of such works. 
The Hooper Report Rights and Wrongs (IPO, 2012) identified libraries, archives and 
museums, educational institutions, the audiovisual industry, the publishing industry, the 
music industry and images industries (still pictures, photo libraries, art works) as creative 
industries and related sectors that would be much better served by a more streamlined 
approach to the handling of copyright licensing in ways that recognised the reasonable 
expectations of existing copyright owners while better enabling the development of new 
forms of digital content and digital services, which are at the core of the emergent digital 
economy. Indeed, by normalising payment arrangements for all forms of copyright 
works, such a scheme is likely to be of financial benefit to copyright owners themselves. 
In their second report, Copyright Works, Hooper and Lynch (2012, p.1) proposed the 
development of a not-for-profit, industry-led Copyright Hub that: 
“links interoperably and scalably to the growing national and international 
network of private and public sector DCXs, rights registries and other 
copyright-related databases, using agreed cross-sectoral and cross-border data 
building blocks and standards, based on voluntary, opt-in, non-exclusive and 
pro-competitive principles.” 
The focus of such a Copyright Hub would not be on “the low volume of customised, high 
monetary value licensing transactions at the top of the market”, for which commercial 
contract remains the most appropriate mechanism for managing rights. Rather, it would 
be on “the very high volume of automatable, low monetary value transactions coming 
mostly from the long tail of smaller users”. These may include: 
“The small digital start-up company wanting to use music and images and text 
creatively for its customers, the teacher in the classroom, a user posting a video 
on YouTube. Larger companies have told us that they also have requirements 
for access to easy to use high volume, low monetary value, low transaction cost 
copyright licensing systems, for example a broadcaster wanting a particular 
film clip or a publisher wanting a specific diagram or image.” [Hooper and 
Lynch, (2012), p.2] 
There is good reason to believe that a similar approach could greatly simplify copyright 
licensing in Australia. An Australian copyright hub could provide a repository of 
information about copyright works and access to a simple marketplace for licensing those 
works. There is ample evidence to suggest that high transaction costs operate as a 
significant barrier for licensing, creating pressures for users to either underuse copyright 
material or to infringe copyright. By reducing both the overall transaction costs, and the 
time consumed in rights negotiations, an DCX could act as a catalyst to new forms of 
creative expression, as indicated in the earlier discussion about documentary filmmaking. 
Creating a marketplace with more readily accessible information (to lower search costs) 
and greater standardisation in licensing agreements (to lower bargaining costs) is a 
crucial part of ensuring that copyright law is appropriate in the digital age, and that the 
deadweight costs associated with the current pre-digital arrangements are substantially 
reduced. 
Importantly, a copyright hub or exchange should not be seen as an alternative to fair 
use. An extended definition of fair use is an essential reform to align copyright with 
community understandings of fairness and to encourage socially valuable uses of 
material, particularly where licensing is unworkable, harms are low, or social benefits are 
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high. In core licensing markets, however, it is in the interests of all actors to enhance 
efficiency by reducing transaction costs. The collecting societies, such as Copyright 
Agency Limited, already provide a substantial amount of the institutional infrastructure 
required for such an exchange to be established and to operate effectively. A DCX should 
simplify the process of dealing with the large and growing volume of ‘small’ uses of 
copyrighted works in ways that dramatically reduce transaction costs and greatly simplify 
processes, while meeting the appropriate rights and expectations of all parties to the 
process of rights licensing: creators of original works; rights owners/holders; rights 
managers; rights users/licensees; and consumers. 
7 Conclusions 
The current copyright reform process, in Australia and in elsewhere, represents the most 
recent in an ongoing process to develop rules that are appropriate to foster creativity and 
innovation in the context of constant technological change. Throughout copyright’s 
history, change in the modes of production and distribution of knowledge and cultural 
works has necessitated a continual re-balancing of the rights allocated to authors, 
producers, intermediaries, and users. In the digital economy, the key challenge is to 
devise appropriate rules that simultaneously allow 
1 a balance between rewards to existing owners and the ability of users to develop new 
expression and enable new uses of existing expression 
2 an appropriate distinction between private rights and public benefits 
3 sufficient regard to the way in which information flows throughout society, generate 
benefits to the community beyond conventional measures of value 
4 a fair distribution of the rewards of creativity and innovation. 
We argue that copyright reform should proceed along two complementary lines. First, the 
zone of uses of copyright material for which it is socially important to allow use without 
permission or compensation needs to be clearly articulated. Many socially valuable 
interactions with copyright material depend on a certain amount of flex in the flow of 
culture and information, and for these uses, a licensing regime, however efficient, is 
unlikely to be optimal. While the exact boundaries of this zone need constant revision in 
light of changes in technology and society, they include, at a minimum, highly 
transformative works that do not compete with the market for their original sources; 
many forms of social critique and commentary; uses which promote learning; and 
personal uses of copyright material. A flexible exception, implemented in a way that 
allows for ongoing contestation and rebalancing of its boundaries, is needed to provide 
copyright rules that adequately balance competing interests. 
Second, we argue that government policy should encourage the development of 
streamlined licensing protocols to minimise transaction costs in the digital economy. The 
development of DCXs, where copyright owners are able to register their works for 
licensing on standard terms, is likely to greatly reduce transaction costs for the large 
volume of relatively low value licences that is expected to form a major part of the digital 
economy. An array of DCXs, potentially linked by ‘copyright hubs’, could feasibly assist 
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both users and copyright owners to reach agreement on mutually acceptable terms of use 
for copyright works. 
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Notes 
1 One difficulty with such a cost-benefit matrix is that of distinguishing between short-run and 
long-run benefits. This is because the time needed for adaptation by rights holders to changes 
in the external environment is not known. 
2 There are important core copyright industries excluded from these surveys of those in the arts, 
including the newspaper and magazine, film, radio and television, and computer games 
industries, which limits the generalisability of these findings. To the best of our knowledge, no 
comparable work has been undertaken on the relevance of copyright-based sources of income 
for those working in these creative industries. 
3 Cathy Henkel is a film producer with Virgo Productions, who has worked as a writer, producer 
and director of documentaries since 1988. She has directed documentaries such as Heroes of 
Our Time: Walking Through a Minefield (1998), Losing Layla (2000), Spike Milligan: I Told 
You I was Ill (2005), The Man Who Stole My Mother’s Face (2004), The Burning Season 
(2008), The Rise of the Eco-Warriors (2012), and Show me the Magic (2012). In 2009, Cathy 
was awarded Documentary Producer of the Year at SPAA for her work on The Burning 
Season. The interview with Cathy Henkel took place in Brisbane on 15 November, 2012. 
